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Security in Central and Eastern Europe: A View From Warsaw
TADEUSZ PIECIUKIEWICZ

From Parameters, Winter 1996-97, pp. 122-35.

Poland's recent obstinate and sometimes impatient efforts to gain membership in European and Euro-Atlantic political
and military structures confuse some Western leaders, particularly those who lack a clear and consistent vision of the
future of the international order in Europe. They also irritate Russia, which continues to demonstrate an interest in
restoring the former Soviet zone of influence on its borders. But this is nothing new: "No one gave more trouble than
the Poles," wrote British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in his memoirs of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, an
observation undoubtedly shared by many of his contemporaries.[1]
A dramatic change has taken place in the fundamental ideas of European security. Europe has been given a unique
opportunity to create a new international order based on common values: democracy, human rights, and the right of
nations to self-determination. The people of Poland want to participate actively in the process of shaping this new
international order.
This article examines briefly Poland's historical experiences which form the foundation of its current security policy. It
concludes with an analysis of Poland's views of alternative concepts of the European security architecture.
Historic Origins of Polish Security Policy
Geographically Poland is a bridge spanning two parts of Europe, but since the 10th century Poles have identified
themselves as an element of Western European civilization. In 966 the first historical ruler of Poland accepted Western
Christianity and established political relations with Rome, the Bohemians, and the German Empire. Poland's
conversion to Christianity was a conscious political move which resulted in the consolidation of the Polish state.[2]
Over the centuries, its central geographic location in Europe has made it impossible for Poland to take the position of a
neutral state. Without natural frontiers such as major rivers or the mountain ranges that protect Switzerland, Poland has
frequently been ravaged by the Germans, Russians, Tartars, Swedes, and Turks. The only way the Poles have been able
to improve their military-political situation has been by securing external allies,[3] a principal feature of Polish foreign
policy since the Middle Ages. As early as the 14th century a Polish-Lithuanian alliance changed the balance of power
in Central and Eastern Europe. It created a force strong enough to defeat the Teutonic Knights, considered at the time
the most powerful military and financial organization in Europe. For four centuries the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth integrated itself into Western culture and successfully defended a large part of Europe between the
Baltic and the Black Sea.[4]
Starting in the 17th century, however, Poland's power declined.[5] Its neighbors--Russia, Prussia, and the AustroHungarian Empire--systematically promoted its internal troubles and intervened in Polish affairs.[6] Finally, during the
period 1792-1795, "the alliance of the three Black Eagles" dismembered Poland, ending efforts by the Poles to put
their state in order.[7]
A long series of national uprisings in the 19th century failed to establish an independent Polish state.[8] Two different
programs of national policy evolved in Poland during this period. The first advocated military action supported by
political-military assistance from France. The second, supported by "political realists," recommended a modus vivendi
with any powerful neighbor that would support the unification of Polish lands, self-government, and ultimately
Poland's independence.
The new political order in Europe after World War I gave Poland its chance. While the Central Powers lost the war,
Russia was not among the winners. A temporary vacuum of power in Central-East Europe provided the Polish nation

with an opportunity to achieve independence. The Poles took advantage of the situation; they created their own armed
forces and undertook intensive military and diplomatic activity.[9] As a result of these efforts, in November 1918 the
Polish Republic came into existence.
Other nations in Central and Eastern Europe sought to create their own states. Warsaw provided political and military
support to attempts by Estonia, Latvia, and the Ukraine to gain real independence.[10] All the new states were
relatively weak; none was strong enough to face alone the threats of their powerful neighbors, Germany and Soviet
Russia. Poland's efforts to foster close cooperation within the region produced disappointing results.[11]
Without an effective system of alliances within the region, Polish leaders were compelled to seek support from
Western Europe. The Polish-French alliance of 1921[12] became the cornerstone of Poland's security policy as Poland
gradually redirected its relations with Germany and Soviet Russia toward the maintenance of an "equilibrium" or
"equal distance" between them. These attempts produced few useful results. France and Britain declined to participate
in military operations against German forces in September 1939 and later when Soviet troops attacked Poland. The end
of World War II also failed to bring Poland real independence. At another critical moment in its history, Poland was
abandoned by the Western Allies when discussions regarding Poland's future took place without Polish participation.
At Teheran in 1943, during the first meeting of "The Big Three," the Western powers accepted the Soviet solution of
Poland's future. The Curzon Line, which had been rejected by Poland in 1920, became the basis for the Polish eastern
frontier, while the division of Europe into zones of postwar influence determined that Poland would fall under Soviet
dominance.[13]
The security policy of the new Polish state, the People's Republic, was a modern version of the tradition of "political
realism." It was defined largely by the bitter experiences of World War II[14] and by Poland's status as a part of the
Soviet empire. Poland's primary goal under such circumstances was to ensure national self-preservation and territorial
integrity within its new borders.
As a result of the decisions made by the victorious powers, Poland's eastern and western borders were changed
dramatically.[15] After the expulsion of Germans from the Recovered Lands in the west of Poland,[16] the area was
repopulated by refugees and by those Poles who had been displaced from the eastern territories that had been annexed
by the Soviet Union. And because the Potsdam Conference failed to define Poland's western frontier, the acquisition of
the Oder-Neisse territories from Germany seemed provisional and provided a basis for Germany to claim its former
lands later. Since the Western Territories constitute a third of postwar Poland, this issue became vital for the
nation.[17] The initial refusal of the Federal Republic to officially recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier was the origin of
prolonged difficulties in Polish-German relations. It also provided the Polish and Soviet communists many
opportunities to remind Poles that only the Soviet Union unequivocally guaranteed their western frontier.
Polish fears were strengthened during the Cold War by an ambiguous "non-commitment" policy of the Western
powers toward the border dispute[18] and by some aspects of the Federal Republic's membership in NATO. In 1960
the Federal Chancellor, Conrad Adenauer, reassured Germans who had been expelled from the Recovered Lands in
1945-46 "that their homeland would be assured, if West Germany remained loyal to NATO."[19] In this context,
Poland could perceive NATO only as a hostile organization; hence, the necessity of an alliance with the Soviet Union
as a cornerstone of Poland's security policy could not be openly questioned.[20]
In the late 1950s Polish leaders identified a relaxation of tensions in Central Europe as the most important of Poland's
national interests. Any military conflict between the two opposite blocks would threaten the very existence of the
Polish nation. As a result, in spite of limited freedom of political choice, Poland undertook her own political initiatives
to create a degree of confidence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
The most well-known of Poland's initiatives was the so-called "Rapacki Plan," first presented by Polish Minister of
Foreign Affairs Adam Rapacki in 1956. As a possible first step toward the relaxation of tensions, Rapacki proposed to
establish a nuclear-free zone that included Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Holland. Unfortunately,
neither the Rapacki Plan nor the 1964 "Gomulka Plan," which proposed to freeze the level of armaments in Central
Europe, was discussed seriously.[21] Rapacki later developed a broader theory of "constructive coexistence" to serve
as the basis for a new Polish policy toward the West.[22] This policy provided for a gradual growth of mutual

understanding and cooperation between Poland and the West that enabled Poland to enlarge its "area of sovereignty"
within the Soviet bloc, culminating in the bloodless Polish revolution of 1989.
Its historical experiences are a permanent part of the political discourse in Poland. The conclusions drawn from these
discussions by Polish historians, politicians, and the citizenry at large became the basis for Poland's present security
policy.
Polish Security Policy: History Repeats . . .
A durable European peace must rest on military cooperation and the gradual integration of Central and Eastern
European nations into existing Western European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Poland would therefore oppose any
attempt to reestablish the balance of power principle as the basis for European security. Such an approach is
incompatible with democracy and with the principle of national self-determination. Moreover, it would be an
invitation to reopen the competition for spheres of influence and the arms race.
Poland's most important geopolitical factor is its location between Germany and Russia. Throughout its history the
Polish state has fought unequal battles against them. Deadly dangerous "contracts" between Poland's powerful
neighbors twice resulted in partition of the Polish state.[23] In the high-stakes game involving its sovereignty and
survival as a free and independent nation, it is obvious that Poland must avoid open confrontation on two fronts.
Ambiguity and indecision have characterized the policies of Western powers toward Central and Eastern European
nations for centuries.[24] The West has always been ready to sacrifice the interests of the smaller nations to advance
its own interests; the Yalta agreement is only the most recent example of this circumstance. Consequently, "Nothing
concerning Poland should be decided without Poland's participation"[25] must be the leading principle of Polish
diplomacy.
A temporary weakness among opponents or the decline of a superpower has always created in Central-Eastern Europe
a vacuum of power which has provided the Poles, Hungarians, Balts, and others in the region the opportunity to
reestablish their national sovereignty. Historically, these conditions have been painfully short-lived; contemporary "big
brothers" have always taken decisive action to rebuild their spheres of influence. The relatively weak new states in the
region remained independent only briefly. These states can improve their military-political situation only by close
regional cooperation and ties to existing, well-established, and effective collective defense alliances.
Polish Security Architecture in Post-Cold War Europe
The first noncommunist Polish government established in 1989 had a unique opportunity to create a new security
policy based on national interest. This opportunity arose during the dramatic changes in the military-political situation
in Europe, highlighted by the diminution and gradual disintegration of the Soviet bloc, followed by the demise of the
Soviet Union itself. The basic aim of Poland's national security policy has always been an independent and safe Poland
in a safe Europe. The fundamental precepts of this policy are the permanency of existing borders, peaceful solution of
all disputes, and support for the idea of establishing an effective pan-European security system. The most recent
attempt to create a security policy that reflected those precepts was greatly complicated by the process of German
unification.
Poland's freedom of political choice in 1989 was limited initially by reopening of the issue of its western frontier with
Germany. Though Poland had signed treaties with both East and West Germany that recognized existing borders, the
expected unification could have changed the situation dramatically. It had the potential to reopen the entire issue of
how Poland's post-World War II borders had been established.
Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl's attitude on this issue was initially "ambiguous," as reported by Polish parliamentary
president Kozakiewicz on visiting Bonn in December 1989. "On the one hand, Kohl referred to the Warsaw Treaty of
1970 and the inviolability of the borders that had been agreed to in this treaty by the FRG and Poland, and also
stressed that there were no aggressive aspirations aimed at changing existing borders. On the other hand, Kohl insisted
that juridically, the German Reich continued to exist within the borders of 1937."[26]

The Polish position, presented by Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was clear: "We have no intention of negotiating with
anyone over the line of this border. It is an established part of the European order . . . . We cannot enter the new
historical stage which is being created by the process of German unification . . . with any ambiguity whatsoever with
regard to the border of unified Germany."[27]
With these qualifications, Polish leaders expressed conditional support for the unification of Germany,[28] expecting
that the Polish position in the border dispute would be supported by the USSR. From Warsaw's perspective in 1990,
Gorbachev's reforms suggested the possibility of a true partnership on the matter of German unification. The Polish
government therefore initially presented a concept of European security architecture that anticipated maintaining the
status quo through continued presence of Soviet troops on German territory.[29] This concept also proposed the
preservation of existing institutions, among them a Warsaw Pact modified to be primarily a political consultative
structure.[30] According to this concept an enhanced Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE,
formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE) would become the forum for a future panEuropean security system.[31]
New ideas, such as Poland's future membership in European organizations, were expressed very carefully by Polish
leaders: "We are interested in initiating at the appropriate time the procedure for associating Poland with the European
Community, while respecting our ties with other Central European countries, including the Soviet Union."[32]
However, during 1990 Poland's position concerning some of the assumptions of its emerging security policy changed
significantly. There were two important reasons for the changes. First, successful Polish-German negotiations resulted
in a definitive recognition of Poland's western frontier by both the Bundestag and the Volkskammer,[33] which
resulted in the Polish-German Border Treaty on behalf of a united Germany on 14 November 1990.[34] With a
resolution to this problem, the primary source of antagonism between Poland and Germany was eliminated.
Second, Polish leaders were disappointed with the position taken by the Soviet Union during the process of German
unification, which jeopardized the creation of a real partnership between Poland and the USSR.[35] Additionally,
events inside the USSR--the incidents in Baku and the beginning of the Lithuanian crisis--called into question the
future of perestroika and the Soviet Union's internal stability. Consequently, by the end of 1990 new formulations of
Polish national security policy emerged. An influential political group--the Forum of the Democratic Right--published
a political manifesto which suggested a policy decisively oriented toward the West, support for the creation of "new
sovereign elements" in the European part of the USSR, and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.[36] The manifesto
supported the idea of elaborating a new system of European security based on NATO and the presence of American
troops as an essential condition for peace in Europe.
Almost immediately these recommendations were incorporated into official Polish policy. Poland's eastern policy
changed, accepting parallel-track relations with the Soviet Union and with separate republics which had declared their
sovereignty, and then the full recognition of sovereignty of these republics.[37] Poland began negotiations with the
USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, and jointly with Hungary and Czechoslovakia undertook steps
toward the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. To replace the Pact, Poland proposed close trilateral cooperation with these
two countries that had been the most advanced in their political and economic transformation.[38]
The Next Steps . . .
A new element in Polish policy toward the West arose in 1991: the view of NATO as a vital part of European security
and the main stabilizing factor on the continent.[39] Polish officials still emphasized that "Poland does not intend to
join NATO in the foreseeable future";[40] at the same time, they called for cooperation with security organizations
such as NATO and the Western European Union.
From the outset of the post-Cold War period, Poland has rejected the idea of establishing a neutral military zone
between NATO and Russia, consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. This idea, unofficially presented by
Henry Kissinger during his stay in Warsaw at the end of 1990[41] was rejected by Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof
Skubiszewski. "The whole of Europe should be treated as a homogeneous area of security. . . . From the point of view
of security, Central Europe in particular cannot became a gray, buffer, or neutral zone. The area in such a situation,
because of its geographical situation, will easily become the object of rivalry of stronger states."[42] In the same

speech Skubiszewski presented other tenets of contemporary Polish security policy:
Support for US military presence in Europe and a reduction of nuclear and conventional forces as important
elements of peace and stabilization on the continent.
A proposal to develop a security system within the OSCE by the creation of an effective mechanism of
obligatory action in crisis situations and a fusion of the OSCE and NATO.
Poland's desire to participate in European integration coupled with Central-East European regional
cooperation.[43]
After two years of independence Poles were still evaluating opportunities and seeking solutions. The concept of the
search was--and remains--that of "opening up to the West, but not closing to the East."[44]
Poland's security policy crystallized by the end of 1992. In November 1992 President Lech Walesa signed a
government white paper on the main principles of Polish security policy from 1993 to 2000. This document, which
also included the new Polish national security strategy, specified that Poland would strive to become a member of
NATO by the year 2000.[45] The new national security strategy is strictly defensive in nature; its primary goal is to
defend state security and territorial integrity.
Some important factors influenced the final shape of Polish security policy. The collapse of the USSR resulted in a
certain destabilization on Poland's eastern border. The international community, specifically the UN and the OSCE,
had shown itself to be helpless in a number of crises, e.g. Bosnia and Chechnya. Also, a sober analysis of the
complexity and interdependence of European and Euro-Atlantic structures pointed out that Polish aspirations
expressed earlier to obtain membership in the European Community (now the European Union) had to be
complemented by parallel efforts aimed at full membership in NATO.
Polish leaders recognize that European security should be based on existing institutions. Never before in its history has
Europe had available a number of institutions for cooperation on security issues. Thus the new architecture of
European security does not require more of them; rather, the challenge is to make the best possible use of existing
ones.
Within these institutions NATO continues to be the most important for European relations. It is more than just a
collective defense alliance. In the post-Cold War era NATO is an effective means for preventing the "renationalization" of security issues and the reemergence of political and military rivalry among the largest West
European countries. The military-political power of NATO can determine the success of decisions made by the UN
and by OSCE. NATO's assumption of the mission in the former Yugoslavia following the UN's decision to withdraw is
a case in point. In addition, the new strategic concept adopted by NATO in November 1991, emphasizing crisis
management and cooperation with other international organizations, helped to clarify and codify a new role for NATO
in the future European security system. Thus NATO remains a decisive factor of stability on the continent; any
realistic planning of European security must include NATO as its basic element.
The first component of the Polish vision of a future European security architecture became an expansion of the area of
security and stabilization represented by NATO. That area should be expanded by including in the Alliance those
countries that share its goals and values, which have the desire to join, and which are capable of contributing
effectively to the accomplishment of those goals. Enlargement should be an open-ended, transparent process that
would not a priori exclude anyone. It should be accompanied by other forms of close relationships between NATO and
those countries that would not want or could not yet become members of the Alliance, especially Russia and Ukraine.
These relations would cover issues of peace and security as well as economic contacts.
Poland strongly supported the thesis that NATO should preserve its current Euro-Atlantic character. Two world wars,
the Cold War, and the Balkan crisis have clearly demonstrated the significance of the active involvement and
leadership of the United States for European security and stability. When America decided to withdraw from Europe
after World War I, there were only 20 years of peace before a new war broke out. Since the end of World War II,
America's presence in Europe has helped the continent to enjoy peace for more than 50 years.
The second component of Poland's concept of European security requires strengthening pan-European institutions, in

particular the OSCE, but also other existing and developing systems of confidence- and security-building measures
(CFE Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, and others). The third component of a European security architecture should be
bilateral relationships in support of programs for close regional cooperation. Poland fully supports the full sovereignty
and independence of the new states that have emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially Ukraine,
Belarus, and the Baltic states. In the opinion of most Polish political experts, "The independence of those countries is
one of the conditions of [Polish] sovereignty and stable development,"[46] because their continuing sovereignty serves
as a buffer against the revitalization of Russian hegemony of Eastern and Central Europe.
Thus mature Polish security policy expresses itself in a radical, pro-Western reorientation in international affairs and
strives for lasting integration within the European Union and NATO. Membership in the Western European and EuroAtlantic structures has been an integral element of Polish national security policy since 1992. It enjoys the support of
all significant Polish political parties and movements, despite their diversity of views on other issues. Polish politicians
and the general population alike have no doubt that Poland should seek links with Western European defense alliances
and collective security systems.[47]
Simultaneously Poland has rejected, as extremely vague and unconvincing, other conceptions of European security
which have been proposed by those who oppose NATO enlargement. Three such rejected concepts are outlined in their
essentials below.
The first is the concept of so-called crisscrossing guarantees for Central and East European countries to be provided by
Russia and the West European countries. This concept has been presented on various occasions by Russian leaders and
diplomats. In the opinion of Polish analysts this course would:
Preserve the current division of Europe into parts with unequal security status. Central-Eastern Europe in
particular would be kept as a "gray zone" and the object of external rivalry.
Ensure that Central-Eastern Europe would remain an object and not a sovereign subject of European relations.
Moreover, the states guaranteeing its security would also retain the right to decide other issues in this region. In
the light of prolonged Polish experiences with Russian "guarantees," this aspect is particularly sensitive.
A second undesirable concept would relegate Central-East European security to the status of a sub-regional security
system. That is not very realistic. The experiences of the interwar period and the negative attitude of some states to the
idea of transforming the Visegrad Group into a closer form of political cooperation indicate the extreme difficulty of
bringing this concept to reality.[48] Moreover, given the potential of the states in the region, the effectiveness of such
a system would be questionable, especially in facing potential external dangers.
The third concept, strongly supported by Russia, rests on the idea of a pan-European security system based on a
radical reform of the OSCE. During the period 1989-1991 Poland supported a similar proposal; today, however, this
concept seems highly unrealistic from the Polish perspective. It is doubtful whether a radical transformation of this
institution, with its membership of more than 50 states, could be possible at all in view of its size and the diverse
interests of its members. Moreover there would be great uncertainty as to whether this "modernized OSCE" would be
effective and whether the United States would be a member. This does not mean that the notion of developing this
institution, which gives European states the sense and right of participation in solving the problems of the continent,
should be rejected. However, until a viable OSCE is created that includes the United States, a strong and inclusive
NATO remains Europe's best hope.
Conclusions
This article portrays the salient features of the evolution of Polish views on European security since 1989. From an
initial careful concept of maintaining some elements of the Cold War status quo, Poland now views NATO as the
foundation for the future structure of European security.
It is necessary to underscore that the fundamental assumptions of Poland's national security policy have not changed
since the country's transformation in 1989, in spite of frequent changes of governments that represented different
political bases. Poland's primary policy goal has remained that of ensuring the sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity of the nation. Polish leaders have always emphasized that the architecture of European security

must be built on the basis of military cooperation and gradual integration of all European states. Between 1989 and
1992 Poland's security policy evolved so that its "center of gravity" came to be defined as improved ties with Western
institutions.
Poland's efforts to gain membership in the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance are the result of a careful
examination of both the Polish historical experience and the experiences of the West European states in building
security through military and economic integration. At present Poland is not directly threatened by any country. This
fact has been publicly recognized by Polish political leaders. Poland does not wish to join NATO in order to seek
guarantees against any specific present danger. Nevertheless, Poland's central location in Europe underscores the fact
that Poland can be safe only in a secure Europe. Because of this Poland cannot remain indifferent to any initiative that
touches upon the architecture of European security; the consequences of such initiatives will affect Europe in much the
same way as did Yalta's "international order."
Poland's integration with the West would serve not only its own interests but those of West European countries and the
United States as well. Among the anticipated candidates for membership in NATO, no other country matches the
potential strategic significance of Poland in terms of population, size, and geostrategic location. Moreover, Poles do
not consider their membership in the Alliance as a one-sided security guarantee. Throughout history Poland has
treated its military alliances as unequivocal obligations; there are numerous examples of Poland's steadfastness in
meeting such obligations. At present a Polish battalion is a part of the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia. Poland is
undertaking this effort primarily in the name of building peace in Europe, but also with a sense of obligation imposed
on it as a country aspiring to NATO membership.
Integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures will be a difficult process requiring consistent and sustained
cooperation of the entire Polish society. It will be a challenge of historic proportions, comparable to the conversion to
Western Christianity, which a thousand years ago strengthened Poland's position in Europe. During that time,
numerous and strong Pomeranian and Polabian tribes remained pagan, excluding themselves from the mainstream of
European civilization. As a result they lost their independence and finally disappeared. Similarly, voluntary isolation
and missing the chance to join NATO and other vital Euro-Atlantic organizations could diminish Poland's position in
Europe and lead ultimately to the loss of Poland's freedom and sovereignty.
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